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LABOR LAW-PICKETING-PER SE APPLICATION OF WASHINGTON COCA 
CoLA DOCTRINE OVERRULED BY THE NLRB--During a labor dispute with 
an electrical contractor, a union picketed the job site, the premises of a 
neutral employer, rather than the office of the primary employer where 
the contractor's employees reported for a few minutes at the beginning 
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and end of each work day. The picket signs stated that the union's dis-
pute was only with the contractor, and the picketing was limited to the 
times when the contractor's employees were present (except that it did 
not stop when the contractor's employees left for lunch and coffee breaks) . 
The neutral employer filed a complaint with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board alleging unfair labor practices1 on the part of the union and 
the trial examiner ruled, in reliance on the Washington Coca Cola doc-
trine, that the picketing was unlawful since the contractor had a regular 
place of business which the union could adequately picket. Moreover, 
under the tests laid down by the Moore Dry Dock Co. case,2 the picketing 
was unlawful since it was done at times when contractor's employees were 
away from the job site. On review by the Board, held, the picketing was 
permissible.3 The Washington Coca Cola doctrine is overruled as a per se 
requirement of ambulatory situs picketing, and the Moore Dry Dock stand-
ards are not to be applied on an indiscriminate per se basis. Local 861, lnt'l 
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 135 N.L.R.B. No. 41 Gan. 12, 1962). 
Under section 8 (b) (4) of the National Labor Relations Act it is an 
unfair labor practice for a union to strike or picket with the objective 
of forcing any person to cease doing business with any other person.4 
Since it is arguable that an object of every strike is to dissuade all persons 
from entering the premises for business reasons, a literal application of 
the statute might outlaw all strike-connected picketing. However, con-
gressional recognition of the right to strike and to engage in other con-
certed activities5 shows that no such sweeping prohibition was ever con-
templated. 6 Rather, section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) was designed to modify the 
right to picket to accord with the congressional feeling that neutral em-
ployers and employees deserve protection from direct and purposeful ef-
forts to involve them in the labor disputes of others.7 Accordingly, even 
before the recent amendments to the act,8 the Board had drawn a line 
1 Brought under NLRA § 8(b)(4)(i)(B), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (Supp. III, 1962). 
2 Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Drydock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). 
3 Members Leedom and Rogers dissented. 
4 NLRA § 8(b)(4)(i)(B), as amended, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (Supp. III, 1962). 
r; NLRA §§ 7, 13, as amended, 61 Stat. 140, 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (1958). 
6 See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1947). 
7 Note, 45 GEo. L. J. 614, 641 (1957). 
s In 1959, the following proviso was added to § 8(b)(4)(i)(B): "Provided, That nothing 
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise 
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." The purpose of the proviso was 
to make it clear that the 1959 amendments to § 8(b)(4) do not overrule or qualify the 
present rules of law permitting picketing at the site of the primary labor dispute. In 
this connection, the Washington Coca Cola case was cited as existing law by the Con-
ference Report. See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1959). The Board, 
however, did not feel it was precluded from a re-examination of Washington Coca Cola. 
See principal case, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (49 L.R.R.l\f.) 1446, 1449 Gan. 12, 1962). 
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between primary (permissible) pressures and secondary (proscribed) ac-
tion. Where the place of business of the employer party to the dispute 
was stationary and geographically removed from the premises of any other 
employer, the Board initially based its determination upon whether the 
pressures were geographically confined to the situs of the dispute.9 Thus, 
if the union pressures extended to the place of business of a neutral em-
ployer, they were secondary.10 Drawing the line was more difficult when 
there was no geographical separation between the premises of the pri-
mary employer and those of the neutral employer.11 In such common-
situs situations where the business operations of a primary employer were 
ambulatory and took place temporarily at the premises of a neutral, 
an ambulatory situs picketing doctrine was developed: under certain 
conditions, picketing at the neutral employer's premises would be 
privileged when the situs of the dispute with the primary employer was 
carried, through the movement of his employees, to the premises of such 
neutral employer.12 In the Moore Dry Dock Co. case, the Board stated 
that this privilege would apply if the following conditions were met: (a) 
The picketing is strictly limited to times when the situs of dispute is 
located on the neutral employer's premises; (b) at the time of the picket-
ing the primary employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs; 
(c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to the location of 
the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses clearly that the dispute is with 
the primary employer.13 The courts have accepted these criteria to exon-
erate this ambulatory situs picketing at the neutral premises,14 and even 
have extended their application to cases where the primary and neutral 
employers occupied a common work site at the primary premises.111 How-
ever, subsequent to Moore Dry Dock, the Board commenced a process 
of refinement which indicated a substantial modification of its earlier 
approach. In the Washington Coca Cola case16 the Moore Dry Dock cri-
9 International Bhd. of Teamsters, 84 N.L.R.B. 360 (1949), order dismissing complaint 
set aside sub nom. International Rice Milling Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 21 (5th Cir. 1950), 
rev'd, 341 U.S. 665 (1951); Oil Workers Union, 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949). 
10 E.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters, 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949), enforced, 184 F.2d 60 
(10th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 947 (1951). 
11 See generally Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-An-
other Chapter, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 125 (1959). 
12 See International Bhd. of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949). 
13 See Sailors Union of the Pacific (Moore Drydock Co.), 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). 
14 See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 228 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. 
Service Trade Chauffeurs Union, 191 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1951). 
lo See Piezonki v. NLRB, 219 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Local 55, Carpenters 
Council, 218 F.2d 226 (10th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Chauffeurs Union, 212 F.2d 216 (7th 
Cir. 1954). 
10 Brewery&: Beverage Drivers (Washington Coca Cola Bottling Works), 107 N.L.R.B. 
299 (1953), enforced, 220 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1955); see also Albert Evans, 110 N.L.R.B. 
748 (1954). 
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teria were qualified by the fact that the primary employer had a permanent 
place of business at which a union could adequately publicize its dispute; 
picketing at the premises of the secondary employer was conclusively pre-
sumed to be unlawful. The Board reasoned that if a union can reach the 
employees of the primary employer at the employer's premises, then it 
cannot accomplish more by appealing to those same employees again at a 
secondary employer's premises. In that situation, it was stated, the only 
reasonable inference was that the picketing is directed at the employees 
of the secondary employer.17 
Judicial reaction to the Washington Coca Cola decision was divided. 
While some courts supported it,18 others, refusing to enforce the Board's 
orders, objected to the rigid application of Washington Coca Cola without 
an analysis of the entire factual context to determine if the proscribed 
object was present.19 Judicial hostility gave impetus to the Board's ap-
proach, in subsequent cases of this type, to rely not only on Washington 
Coca Cola, but alternatively upon a consideration of the totality of 
circumstances in finding the proscribed objective set forth in section 
8 (b) (4) (i) (B) .20 
In the principal case, the Board, in overruling the Washington Coca 
Cola doctrine, has shifted its position with respect ·to ambulatory situs 
picketing. 21 Henceforth, a determination as to whether such picketing 
is privileged will be dependent upon the presence or absence of the pro-
scribed object as determined by an examination of the totality of the evi-
dence. This position is further manifested in the Board's_ declaration that 
picketing is permissible during lunch and coffee breaks, the Board 
stating that the Moore Dry Dock standards "are not to be applied on an 
indiscriminate 'per se' basis, but are to be regarded merely as aids in 
determining the underlying question of statutory violation."22 The deci-
11 Local 657, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 115 N.L.R.B. 981, 984 (1956). 
18 NLRB v. Local 182, Teamsters Union, 272 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1959); NLRB v. 
General Drivers Union, 251 F.2d 494 (6th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. United Steelworkers, 250 
F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1957). 
19 Sales Drivers, 110 N.L.R.B. 2192 (1954), enforcement denied, 229 F.2d 514 (D.C. 
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 972 (1956); General Drivers, 109 N.L.R.B. 275 (1954), 
enforcement denied, 225 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955); cf. NLRB 
v. Local 294, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters, 284 F.2d 887, 890-91 (2d Cir. 1960); NLRB v. 
Business Mach. Workers, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956). 
20 See, e.g., Local 522, Lumber Drivers, 126 N.L.R.B. 297 (1960); Local 294, lnt'l Bhd. 
of Teamsters, 124 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1959); Commission House Drivers, 118 N.L.R.B. 130 
(1957); Chauffeurs Union, 117 N.L.R.B. 1344 (1957). 
21 See Local 59, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 49 L.R.R.M. 1527 (Jan. 24, 1962), where 
the principal case was followed and reaffirmed. As a prelude to the principal case, see 
Local 662, Radio Workers, 133 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (1961), where Washington Coca Cola 
was distinguished on the grounds that the radio station, by using mobile broadcasting 
units during a strike, moved its regular place of business to a neutral employer's situs 
when a mobile unit parked in front of the neutral employer's store and broadcast from 
there. 
22 Principal case, 2 LAB. Rn.. REP. (49 L.R.R.M.) 1446, 1449 (Jan. 12, 1962). 
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sion made clear, however, that the opportunity to picket the primary 
employer's principal place of business still remains a factor to be consid-
ered, along with the Moore Dry Dock criteria, in determining whether 
particular ambulatory situs picketing is permissible. 
This change in attitude toward the nature of the primary-secondary 
distinction is also manifested in recent Board and Supreme Court decisions 
dealing with picketing that occurs on the premises of the primary employer, 
for it may be said that there, too, the original "physical situs" approach 
has been replaced by one focusing on the union objective as found from 
the totality of facts.23 In broader context, the decision is representative of 
the Board's general dissatisfaction with per se rule making, and a return 
to the traditional exercise of the Board's expertise on the whole record 
on an ad hoc basis.24 Admittedly, in the area of strike picketing the in toto 
approach may be more difficult to apply since all picketing would seem to 
seek attainment of the proscribed object. As a result, greater weight will 
probably be placed upon the actual effect of the picketing on neutral 
employers and employees, though ostensibly the Board's newly adopted 
approach provides the union greater freedom since the burden of proving 
the presence of the proscribed object falls on the Board's general counsel.21; 
Although much can be said for the utility of objective criteria as providing 
fixed guides for conduct, labor law-more specifically picketing-seems to 
be an area unsuitable for the application of per se criteria. The variety 
of factual settings and industries affected makes any such approach unde-
sirable since inevitably there will be some cases where such an approach 
would serve to nullify the statutory right to picket. For example, under 
the Washington Coca Cola doctrine, to find unlawful all picketing at the 
situs where the employees of the primary employer spend practically their 
entire working day simply because, as here, they may report for a few 
minutes at the beginning and end of each day to the regular place of 
business of the employer, seems an indefensible position.26 Instead, the 
better approach, as expressed in the principal case, would appear to be 
an inquiry directed toward determining whether the union's purpose, with 
23 See Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961); Retail 
Fruit & Vegetable Clerks' Union, 116 N.L.R.B. 856 (1956). But see Teamsters Union v. 
NLRB, 293 F.2d 881 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See generally Note, 45 GEO. L.J. 614 (1957); Note, 
36 IND. L.J. 203 (1961). 
24 See address by Member Brown, Institute on Labor Law, Duke University Law 
School, Feb. 9, 1962. 1 LAB. REL. REP. (49 L.R.R.) 364, 370. 
25 NLRA § 10, as amended, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1958). 
26 Although the Board chose not to, the "Washington Coca Cola rule can be dis-
tinguished, since ostensibly the union could not picket the primary employer effectively. 
Brotherhood of Painters, 110 N.L.R.B. 455 (1954). But see Albert Evans, 110 N.L.R.B. 
748 (1954). See also General Drivers, 109 N.L.R.B. 275 (1954), where the Board sug-
gested that in construction cases the actual situs of the dispute may be decisive. But 
see NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 228 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1956). 
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due regard to all the circumstances, is to accomplish the proscribed object 
of involving neutral employers and employees in tlle subject labor dis-
pute.27 This will, of course, give rise to a Board-imposed responsibility on 
the part of the union to shield neutral employers and others from con-
troversies not their own. Though Moore Dry Dock offers broad guidelines, 
the precise nature and extent of this responsibility can best be determined 
as each case arises-insuring flexibility and a proper balance of all the 
rights involved.2s 
John W. Galanis 
27 See Upholsterers Union, 132 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1961), where the Board held that 
union intent is to be resolved in light of all the evidence in the particular case, thus 
overruling United Wholesale Employees, 129 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960), which applied a 
"foreseeable consequence" test. Cf. NLRB v. Business Mach. Workers, 228 F.2d 553 (2d 
Cir. 1955). 
28 See Superior Derrick Corp. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1960), where the 
court declared that common situs picketing put an affirmative duty on the primary 
union to inform all secondary employees that the primary union does not seek the 
proscribed object. See also Seafarers Int'! Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 1638 (1958), where the 
Board declared that it was the union's duty to answer questions asked by the neutral 
firm's employees and to assure them that the union had no intent to disrupt their 
employer's business. 
